Part I · Foundations
Chapter 1
What Is Artificial Intelligence?
Seventy years of trying to write intelligence down — and why we stopped.
In one sentenceAI began as an effort to encode intelligence as explicit symbols and rules, and turned toward learning from data when hand-written knowledge proved too brittle to scale.
The question
Can machines think?
In 1950 the mathematician Alan Turing opened a paper with that question — and immediately set it aside. "Think" and "machine" have no precise definitions, so the argument could go on forever. Instead he proposed a game: an interrogator types questions to two hidden players, a person and a machine. If the interrogator can't reliably tell which is which, on what grounds would we deny the machine intelligence?
The imitation game, now called the Turing test, set the tone for the field that followed: judge intelligence by what a system does. It also contained a warning that is more relevant now than ever — behaving like something that understands is not the same as understanding.
The Turing test replaces the vague question 'Can machines think?' with a concrete one: can a machine's conversation be told apart from a human's?
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At the end of the same paper, Turing suggested that rather than programming an adult mind directly, it might be easier to build a "child machine" and teach it. Hold on to that idea. It took decades to become the dominant approach.
1956
A field is born
In the summer of 1956 a small group of researchers gathered at Dartmouth College for a workshop proposed by John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Nathaniel Rochester and Claude Shannon. Their proposal named the field — artificial intelligence — and stated its founding conjecture: that every aspect of learning or intelligence could, in principle, be described so precisely that a machine could simulate it.
What followed was two decades of optimism, and an approach that would dominate AI for thirty years: symbolic AI. Intelligence, the idea went, is the manipulation of symbols — facts, rules, goals — by general procedures like logic and search.
Symbolic AI represents knowledge as explicit symbols and rules written by people, and produces intelligent behaviour by manipulating them — through logic and search.
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How it worked
Intelligence as symbols and rules
A symbolic system knows only what it has been told, in an explicit form: Socrates is a man; all men are mortal. An inference engine applies rules to facts to derive new ones: Socrates is mortal. Every conclusion can be traced back to the rules that produced it — a property modern learned models often lack.
To reason about the world, the system also needs a model of it: categories, properties, relations. Researchers invented semantic networks, frames and ontologies to write this knowledge down — ideas that survive today in knowledge graphs and database schemas.
Rule-based AI stores knowledge as if–then rules and derives conclusions by chaining them together, forward from facts or backward from goals.
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Knowledge representation is the problem of writing down what a system knows — objects, categories, relations, defaults — in a form a machine can reason with.
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Intelligence as search
The other pillar was search. Many problems — a puzzle, a route, a proof, a chess game — can be described as a start state, a set of possible actions and a goal. Solving the problem means finding a sequence of actions that reaches the goal. The trouble is that the number of possible sequences explodes: with 35 options per move, looking ten moves ahead already means about possibilities.
The answer was the heuristic: a rule of thumb for which possibilities look promising. Try it below — all three algorithms find the goal, but compare how much of the grid each one has to explore.
Try it
Draw walls on a grid and watch breadth-first, depth-first and A* search find their way — and count how much each has to explore.
Search solves a problem by exploring sequences of possible actions from a start state until one reaches the goal — and a good heuristic decides which possibilities to explore first.
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Combine search with a model of actions — what each one needs and what it changes — and you get planning. SRI's robot Shakey (1966–72) planned its own routes and actions this way, and the project gave the world the A* algorithm.
Planning means finding a sequence of actions that turns the current situation into a goal situation, using a model of what each action requires and changes.
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1970s–1980s
Expert systems
General problem-solvers turned out to be weak on real problems. By the 1970s a new insight took hold: in practice, expertise comes from detailed domain knowledge. So researchers sat with experts, extracted their know-how as hundreds or thousands of if–then rules, and built expert systems.
They worked — in their niches. Stanford's MYCIN diagnosed blood infections about as acceptably as specialists in a 1979 evaluation. DEC's XCON configured computer orders from 1980, grew to about 2,500 rules, and was estimated to save the company $25 million a year. A commercial boom followed: AI companies, specialized hardware, corporate AI departments.
Expert systems captured a human specialist's knowledge as hundreds or thousands of if–then rules, and were AI's first big commercial success.
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The cold
Winter
Twice, AI's promises ran far ahead of what it could deliver, and twice the money disappeared. The first AI winter (roughly 1974–1980) followed disappointing results in machine translation and critical reviews such as the UK's 1973 Lighthill report. The second began in 1987, when the market for specialized LISP machines collapsed and companies discovered how expensive expert systems were to maintain.
AI winters were periods when inflated expectations collided with limited results, and funding and interest in AI collapsed for years.
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The problem
Why writing intelligence down failed
The deeper cause wasn't hardware or funding. It was the knowledge-acquisition bottleneck. The hard part of a rule-based system is not reasoning with knowledge; it's getting the knowledge in.
- Experts can't articulate what they know. Recognizing a face, reading an X-ray, understanding a sentence — we do these without being able to state the rules.
- Rules have exceptions, which have exceptions. Birds fly — except penguins, and injured birds, and… Each patch adds rules that interact in unexpected ways, and systems become brittle.
- Common sense is enormous. Everyday reasoning relies on millions of unwritten facts. Encoding them by hand never came close to finishing.
The knowledge-acquisition bottleneck is the discovery that the hardest part of rule-based AI is getting the knowledge in: much of what experts know is tacit, full of exceptions, and too vast to write down.
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The idea
From rules to learning
If the rules can't be written, perhaps they can be learned. Give a system many examples with the right answers, a model with adjustable parameters, and an algorithm that tunes those parameters to fit the examples. The knowledge ends up in the parameters, and nobody has to write it down.
Try both approaches on the same problem. First write a spam filter by hand; then watch new messages arrive; then let a learning algorithm build one from examples.
Try it · toy model
Build a spam filter the 1980s way — by writing rules — then watch it meet new messages. Finally, let a learning algorithm work it out from examples instead.
Traditional programs turn rules and inputs into answers; machine learning turns inputs and answers into the rules — learning the knowledge from examples instead of having it written in.
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This wasn't a new idea — Rosenblatt's perceptron (1958) and Samuel's checkers player (1959) both learned. What changed over the following decades was the amount of data, the speed of computers, and better algorithms. By the 1990s statistical machine learning was quietly winning on practical problems; in 2012 deep learning broke through in image recognition; and the story that leads to today's language models began.
The transition this chapter tells
- Symbolic AI
- Expert Systems
- The Knowledge-Acquisition Bottleneck
- From Rules to Learning
- Machine learning
- Deep learning
- LLMs
Why it matters
Why it matters
It explains why modern AI looks the way it does. Data-hungry models, enormous training runs and the constant search for better datasets are all consequences of choosing to learn knowledge rather than write it.
Symbolic ideas never left. Search, planning, logic and knowledge graphs run inside maps, compilers, databases and games — and today's AI agents are often a learned model wrapped in symbolic scaffolding: tools, plans, structured outputs, verifiers. Whether reasoning in modern models needs more explicit symbolic structure is an open research question Active research.
It is a lesson in reading claims. Both AI winters followed a gap between impressive demonstrations and reliable capability. The habit this site builds — separating established evidence from interpretation and speculation — is the practical lesson of this history.
Concepts in this chapter
Mark each one as you go. Must-know concepts are the core path.
- AI WintersAI winters were periods when inflated expectations collided with limited results, and funding and interest in AI collapsed for years.UnderstandMust know
- Expert SystemsExpert systems captured a human specialist's knowledge as hundreds or thousands of if–then rules, and were AI's first big commercial success.UnderstandMust know
- The Knowledge-Acquisition BottleneckThe knowledge-acquisition bottleneck is the discovery that the hardest part of rule-based AI is getting the knowledge in: much of what experts know is tacit, full of exceptions, and too vast to write down.Know wellMust know
- Logic and RulesRule-based AI stores knowledge as if–then rules and derives conclusions by chaining them together, forward from facts or backward from goals.UnderstandMust know
- From Rules to LearningTraditional programs turn rules and inputs into answers; machine learning turns inputs and answers into the rules — learning the knowledge from examples instead of having it written in.Know wellMust know
- SearchSearch solves a problem by exploring sequences of possible actions from a start state until one reaches the goal — and a good heuristic decides which possibilities to explore first.Know wellMust know
- Symbolic AISymbolic AI represents knowledge as explicit symbols and rules written by people, and produces intelligent behaviour by manipulating them — through logic and search.Know wellMust know
- The Turing TestThe Turing test replaces the vague question 'Can machines think?' with a concrete one: can a machine's conversation be told apart from a human's?UnderstandMust know
- Knowledge RepresentationKnowledge representation is the problem of writing down what a system knows — objects, categories, relations, defaults — in a form a machine can reason with.UnderstandShould know
- PlanningPlanning means finding a sequence of actions that turns the current situation into a goal situation, using a model of what each action requires and changes.UnderstandShould know
What do I actually need to remember?
- Turing (1950) reframed 'Can machines think?' as a behavioural test — and suggested machines that learn.
- Dartmouth (1956) named the field; for thirty years AI mostly meant symbolic AI.
- Symbolic AI = knowledge written as symbols and rules + general procedures (logic, search).
- Search explores possible action sequences; heuristics (e.g. A*) make it feasible.
- Expert systems (MYCIN, XCON) worked in narrow domains and launched a 1980s boom.
- Two AI winters (≈1974–80, from 1987) followed promises that outran capabilities.
- The knowledge-acquisition bottleneck: real knowledge is tacit, exception-ridden and vast — too much to write down.
- The fix: learn the knowledge from data — rules + data → answers became data + answers → rules.
- Symbolic methods live on inside modern systems (search, planning, tools, knowledge graphs).
You do not need to memorize everything else. This list is the revision sheet.
Key papers
Computing Machinery and Intelligence
A. M. Turing · 1950 · Mind
Replaced the unanswerable question 'Can machines think?' with a testable one — the imitation game — and anticipated learning machines decades early.
- Problem
- 'Thinking' has no agreed definition, so the question of machine intelligence seemed impossible to discuss scientifically.
- What was new
- An operational test based on conversation, a systematic rebuttal of objections to machine intelligence, and a proposal to build 'child machines' that learn rather than being fully programmed.
How to read it: Very readable, even witty. Section 7, 'Learning Machines', is remarkably prescient — read it after Chapter 1.
A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, August 31, 1955
John McCarthy, Marvin L. Minsky et al. · 1955 · Reprinted in AI Magazine 27(4), 2006
The document that named the field 'artificial intelligence' and set out its founding ambition.
- Problem
- Scattered work on thinking machines had no shared name, agenda or community.
- What was new
- A two-month study proposed on the conjecture that every aspect of learning or intelligence can in principle be described precisely enough for a machine to simulate it.
- Influenced
- Computer science as empirical inquiry
How to read it: Short. Notice how many of its topics — language, neuron nets, abstraction, self-improvement — are still open problems.
A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity
Warren S. McCulloch, Walter Pitts · 1943 · The Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics
The first mathematical model of a neuron as a logic unit — the seed of both neural networks and the idea that thought could be computation.
- Problem
- How could networks of simple nerve cells carry out logical reasoning?
- What was new
- Idealized binary neurons with thresholds, shown to be able to compute logical functions when connected into networks.
How to read it: Historically important but hard to read today. The idea — neurons as threshold logic gates — is what matters.
The perceptron: A probabilistic model for information storage and organization in the brain.
F. Rosenblatt · 1958 · Psychological Review
Introduced the perceptron — a neuron model that learns its weights from examples. Every neural network descends from it.
- Problem
- McCulloch–Pitts neurons could compute, but their connections had to be designed by hand.
- What was new
- A learning rule that adjusts connection strengths from experience, so the system improves at recognizing patterns.
Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers
A. L. Samuel · 1959 · IBM Journal of Research and Development
One of the first programs that improved by learning from play — an early demonstration that learning can beat hand-tuning.
- Problem
- Writing a strong game evaluation by hand required expertise the programmer might not have.
- What was new
- Search combined with an evaluation function whose weights were adjusted automatically from experience, including self-play.
ELIZA—a computer program for the study of natural language communication between man and machine
Joseph Weizenbaum · 1966 · Communications of the ACM
A pattern-matching chatbot that people readily attributed understanding to — an early lesson in how easily fluent text is mistaken for intelligence.
- Problem
- Could a simple program sustain something that felt like conversation?
- What was new
- Keyword-triggered transformation rules (the famous 'DOCTOR' script) producing plausible replies with no model of meaning.
A Formal Basis for the Heuristic Determination of Minimum Cost Paths
Peter Hart, Nils Nilsson, Bertram Raphael · 1968 · IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics
Introduced A*, the heuristic search algorithm still used in route planning, games and robotics.
- Problem
- Blind search explores far too many states; how can knowledge about the goal guide it without losing optimality?
- What was new
- Rank states by cost-so-far plus an estimate of cost-to-go; with an estimate that never overestimates, the first path found is optimal.
Computer science as empirical inquiry
Allen Newell, Herbert A. Simon · 1976 · Communications of the ACM
The classic statement of the symbolic-AI worldview: the physical symbol system hypothesis and heuristic search as the heart of intelligence.
- Problem
- What, if anything, do all intelligent systems have in common?
- What was new
- The claim that a physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action.
How to read it: Their 1975 Turing Award lecture. Read it as the best case for the approach this chapter shows running into limits.
What came next?
Chapter 2
Why does every AI paper look like a wall of Greek letters — and which parts actually matter?